Symposium: *Janus v. AFSCME*

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On September 28, 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States officially agreed to hear the case of *Mark Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31*, known colloquially as *Janus v. AFSCME*. The case considers whether the 1977 ruling of *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education*, which determined that public-sector unions may collect “agency shop” and "fair share" fees from non-members covered under bargaining agreements, shall be overruled as a violation of the First Amendment. The case is largely a reincarnation of *Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association*, which ended in a deadlock in March 2017 after the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia, whose vote would likely have ruled in favor of the plaintiff. With President Donald Trump's appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch, it is almost certain that he will now cast the decisive vote to side with Mark Janus, ruling the collection of the above-mentioned fees unconstitutional. As many readers of this newsletter well know, the stakes here are considerable. Public-sector union density is currently at 35.7% nationally, while the private sector is at a measly 6.4%. If Wisconsin post-2011 is any indicator, where restrictions that are even more extensive contributed to a shocking 27.6% drop in public-sector density over a five-year period, eliminating agency fee mechanisms nation-wide will sure deal a considerable blow to public-sector membership.

Nevertheless, the *Janus* decision need not be the end for public-sector unions. In November 2017, the Joseph S. Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor Studies at CUNY hosted a conference entitled "*Janus* and Beyond: The Future of Public Sector Unions," where organizers and labor scholars, including our very own Ruth Milkman and Penny Lewis, came together to strategize on preparing for *Janus*. Contributions to this issue's symposium will focus on this topic as well. Dan Clawson reflects on the Massachusetts Teachers Association's "All-In" campaign and strategies for reaching out to membership. César F. Rosado Marzán analyzes the Puerto Rican bona fide voluntary labor organizations as a source of inspiration for public-sector unions post-*Janus*. Luke Elliot-Negri’s essay shares experiences in preparing for *Janus* while organizing academic workers in the Professional Staff Congress local of the American Federation of Teachers at CUNY. Last, Ben and Sarah Manski reconsider aspects of the Wisconsin Uprising and the importance of leadership for the purposes of planning popular mobilization against *Janus* as well as its potential outcomes.

**Fighting Back Against Janus**

*Dan Clawson, University of Massachusetts Amherst*

In Wisconsin, unions were caught by surprise when Governor Scott Walker and the legislature passed devastating anti-labor legislation. For teacher unions, which I know best, the initial hit was bad, and even worse, rather than recovering and bouncing back, over time the slide continued. Since the law was passed, education unions have lost more than half of their professional (=teacher) members, and more than three-quarters of their support staff membership. In Michigan the losses were lower, but still devastating: more than 1 out of 5 teachers, and more than half the support staff.

Unions will have no excuse for being caught by surprise late this spring when the Supreme Court decides the Janus case, taking away any kind of “agency fee” or “fair share” payments for public sector workers who do not join. We are threatened with a tsunami. When a tsunami is coming, if there is a good alert system people have from two to eight hours notice; for this anti-union tsunami we have perhaps six months notice. If we don’t get ready, that’s on us.

The 116,000 member Massachusetts Teachers Association (NEA) has a left-wing rank-and-file president and a strong (but still minority) rank-and-file caucus, Educators for a Democratic Union; we have 438 separate locals scattered across the state, mostly K-12 teachers but including a range from faculty at UMass Amherst to custodians and bus drivers on Cape Cod. We faced the same question as all other public sector
units: How should unions respond? Some unions (looking at you, SEIU) have responded to the looming Janus decision by cutting staff. Our union made the decision to hire ten additional temporary (=15 month) organizers to work to build the union and to limit our losses. We estimate that in the best case we will lose 10 percent of our membership; in the worst case we might lose far more.

The “All-In” campaign we have launched is based on research, common sense, and a long history of union practice which shows (1) When the union is under attack, people stay with the union not because it gives them discounts on car insurance, museum admissions, and airport parking, but rather because the union provides solidarity, and a way of achieving people’s collective goals and (2) that if people have had personal conversations (not mass emails) about the union then they are far more likely to stick with the union.

Even the most dedicated and hard-working local union president can’t have 500 one-on-one conversations, and even if they could do so, it wouldn’t be the kind of organizing that builds solidarity and capacity. Our challenge is to recruit, train, and develop rank-and-file leaders, each of whom will agree to talk to 10 to 20 other members. (Ideally each rank-and-file leader will have multiple conversations with the member over the year, but realistically the key, at least at this point, is holding that first conversation.)

Finding and developing those leaders is a huge task, but if we can do it we will be a far stronger union. Some locals already have well-functioning systems of building reps, so for them this is not much of a challenge. But many locals do not: they rely on the local president, or on paid staff, to be “the union.” If those locals don’t change, they are likely to be in deep trouble when the Janus decision comes down. Even if each of the people we recruit has conversations with twenty (rather than ten) members, that would mean we needed to recruit 5,800 rank-and-file leaders. (I’m glad to share materials with anyone interested in helping a union campaign.)

How is the campaign going? So far there’s huge variation. Some locals have embraced the campaign and participants are energized by the conversations and the response. Many locals support the campaign in theory, but in practice have done little, continuing to work in the old ways, not knowing how to recruit member-leaders, finding it difficult to get people to talk to fellow workers. Almost no one has openly opposed the campaign, but in some locals the president has insisted that all activity must flow from the president down, and then the president has done nothing – presumably wanting to stay in control, and fearful of what happens if dozens of their members get trained, start talking with each other, and create energy around what the union could be doing (if only it had better leadership).

We have six months or so before the Janus decision comes down. Our ability to build a strong sense of what the union is and why it matters will determine our strength going forward. We are emphasizing that when people stay in the union that builds our collective solidarity and ability to win on the issues that matter to all of us; when people leave that hurts all of us. Our case is made easier by the fact that a year ago we defeated a ballot measure (backed by $24 million of dark money hedge fund contributions) that would have drastically expanded charter schools and devastated public schools. Next year, exactly as we are signing people up in the post-Janus world, we will be promoting a state-wide referendum to raise taxes by four percent only on incomes over a million dollars a year – a measure that would bring in more than two billion dollars a year, dedicated to education and transportation.

A Likely New Role for Labor After Janus: Lessons from Puerto Rico

César F. Rosado Marzán, University of Iowa College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law

Can public sector labor unions survive in a voluntaristic, post-Janus world? Here, I use the Puerto Rican experience with voluntarism to argue that public sector labor unions could survive in a post-Janus world. However, in that post-Janus world many unions will need to adapt to the new institutional environment. They will need act less as collective bargaining institutions – a role that no longer will fully suit them- and more as social movements. Unions may be able to pressure the government to re-institutionalize them as collective bargaining agents, but such re-institutionalization will require a major refocus of their strategies. Perhaps, in the end, something better than our current system may also be built.

Janus v. AFSCME Council 31

More than 40 years ago, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
public sector unions could compulsorily charge bargaining unit members for a “fair share” or “service fee” to pay for the cost of representing workers in collective bargaining. For some years now, however, conservative groups have been taking cases to the courts aiming to overturn Abood. The main claim against Abood is that public sector unions engage in political speech, even when concerning narrow collective bargaining issues such as wages. Abood opponents thus claim that public sector collective bargaining is “designed to influence governmental policies.” As such, laws that force workers to pay a service or fair share fee are being compelled to support particular governmental policies in violation of First Amendment rights.

The Court came close to overturn Abood three years ago in Friedricks v. California Teachers Association. Justice Antonin Scalia died, however, before the case could be decided. The Court, deadlocked in a 4-4 tie, refused to decide Friedricks. Since then, a new Supreme Court justice sits on the bench, likely providing a conservative majority to overturn Abood. If Abood is overturned, will public sector unions survive?

Learning from Puerto Rico

In 1998, a public sector collective bargaining law gave public sector unions in the U.S. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico the right to bargain collectively. As part of their newfound right to bargain collectively, unions could also collect compulsory “fair share” union fees from bargaining unit members. Some union leaders, most of them affiliated to U.S. “international” unions, claimed that as a result of the new law over 100,000 workers were organized. I reported these numbers in my 2005 PhD dissertation (Rosado Marzán 2005).

However, two years later I wrote an article published in WorkingUSA where I reported, after taking a closer look at the numbers, that the vast majority of these “newly” organized union members were already members of labor organizations existing before the new law – the so-called “bona fide” associations (Rosado Marzán 2007). Bona fide associations were voluntary associations that, while lacking collective bargaining rights, pressured the government through political action. In essence, the 1998 law simply changed the institutional make-up of these former organizations, but did not lead to any new, substantial organizing.

Growing up in Puerto Rico in the 1980s and 1990s, I remember the bona fide as militant organizations that periodically engaged in hybrid strike-political demonstrations known in the island as “paros” – or work stoppages. In some ways, they resembled French unions, known for taking on broad social issues and on the particular issues facing their memberships. Hence, for example, public school teachers would demonstrate not only for higher pay for all public sector workers, but also for quality education and the defense of Spanish-language instruction in public schools, a contentious issue in Puerto Rico given the island’s colonial relationship with the U.S.

The older system was not perfect perhaps being more exciting. Enough is to say that there was no effective collective bargaining in the public sector despite the paros and the street mobilizations. But today’s public sector unions also appear weak and ineffective. The 1998 law banned strikes, forced unions to bargain over very narrow “subjects of bargaining,” limited their use of union funds, amidst many other limitations. Unions’ public presence diminished. Their capacity to improve the wages and working conditions of public sector workers through collective bargaining also proved debatable, at best, not least given the economic depression that has hit Puerto Rico since on or about 2006. And, as stated above, the new system did not fundamentally grow the size of organized workers in the public sector.

Unions as Social Movements and the Emergence of a New Type of Collective Bargaining

Some unions may survive as effective bargaining agents despite Janus. In Las Vegas, for example, private sector hotel workers enjoy very strong collective bargaining agreements dispute “right to work” rules where unions cannot collect any type of compulsory union fee. But for those unions that will lose significant union funds and will not be able to sustain themselves as collective bargaining institutions, things will need to change. They will need to start acting as the Puerto Rican bona fide. They will have to engage in street-level political action to pressure the government on behalf of workers generally; in the words of the Janus plaintiffs, they will have to “influence governmental policies” but, now, nakedly outside the institutionalized structures of collective bargaining. In that fight, unions should also pressure public sector employers to bargain with them as representative of their members only. Perhaps, the new voluntary unions can induce the government to extend the collectively bargained terms to all other workers, union members or not. This type of voluntary but central-
ized system of bargaining is the one that pervades in countries with stronger union institutions, such as Germany, Belgium, Norway, and many others, and should be the aim of our own labor activists. It would be, in the words of some American labor law scholars, a “new labor law” (cf. Andrias 2016) built from the bottom up and after an arduous political process that seems difficult, uncertain, and necessary.

References

Building Power Before Janus—and After: Lessons from CUNY

Luke Elliott-Negri, The Graduate Center, CUNY

As recently as 2014, just 22 percent of my co-workers were members of our chapter in our big wall-to-wall union. The rest—some 1,242 employees—paid the “agency fee,” which for us is the same as membership dues. The chapter had been defunct for several years. Few bothered to explain to new employees why it mattered to join and what power might come from engagement.

Both because of the right-wing assault in the form of legal cases like Janus v. AFSCME—the Supreme Court case that will make the whole public sector “right-to-work” by next year—but also because this is what unions should be doing anyway, a group of us set out to change these numbers.

Three years later, we have convinced nearly 800 fee-payers to become union members. But that’s just the union’s net gain—the real number is even more striking, because each year 200–300 new people are hired and about the same number leave. In reality we’ve signed up between 1,000 and 1,500 members over the past three years.

Here are some lessons that may be relevant in other unions.

OUR UNION

The Professional Staff Congress is an American Federation of Teachers local (2334) representing some 25,000 full-time faculty, part-time faculty, professional staff, graduate employees, lab technicians, and more. We are part of a single bargaining unit that negotiates a single contract, and are by far the largest union at the City University of New York (CUNY), the country’s largest urban college system.

I am active in the local’s Graduate Center chapter. Its ranks include well-known authors like Frances Fox Piven, online adjuncts making an extremely low $3,200 per course, and graduate student employees—the largest segment of the chapter—making little more (or sometimes less). It was in this highly stratified environment that we signed up more than 1,000 members over three years.

TO START, FIND A SMALL CREW

When I arrived at the CUNY Graduate Center, the union chapter had been defunct for years and there was no formal union presence in the building. A longtime leader of a different chapter, who happened to work in the building, helped orient me to the union.

Initially, I connected with two particularly agitated co-workers. Before we started organizing in earnest, we convinced the union to change a policy so as to make it easier for graduate employees to affiliate with our chapter. This took several months of planning, conversations, meetings with central leadership, and ultimately a vote of the local’s Delegate Assembly.

With this change in place, a few of us set about to sign up fee-payers as members. This team ended up being different from the one that had lobbied for the structural change, and the central union’s assigned staff organizer was eager to support us.

In the first year we didn’t have much, but it was enough to get started.

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE WORKPLACE STRUCTURE

We soon learned that the 200–300 new adjunct and graduate employees who were hired every year came through one room for a large orientation over three days. A rank-and-file leader and an organizer sta-
tioned themselves there every day and together signed up more than 100 members.

Our approach to these new members was two-fold. First, in our conversations we framed what their work experience would be like. Because they were just starting, they did not yet have issues, but we were able to relay common issues and help them imagine their future work experience.

As important, we told people we were organizing our constituency to make demands of management that we did not previously have the power to attain. Signing a card made them part of this effort. We also, of course, looked for potential leaders.

Now this recruitment at orientation is an annual ritual, with many more involved—eight rank-and-file leaders helped cover those three days this year, where we signed up 150 members.

We also soon took advantage of our building’s bottleneck. The thousands of people who stream in and out daily come through a single entrance. We set up shop there with union membership cards at times of maximum traffic. This is the university-worker equivalent of focusing on shift changes.

People often have more time when they are leaving, and this is the opportunity for strong one-on-one conversations, not just about why it’s important to be a member but also to learn about the issues that individuals and groups are facing.

**STRIKE VOTE**

In 2015, our union president announced a strike authorization vote for the whole PSC-CUNY bargaining unit, something that had not happened in our union since 1973. We had been working under an expired contract since 2010 with no raises in that time. Striking is illegal for public sector unions in New York state (though voting to strike is not), so the action sent a shock wave through the membership.

In the month before the vote, and during the 10 days of the vote itself, we built more leaders than before or since. Our small crew scrambled to consolidate all rank-and-file activists, however marginally engaged, and to make the vote something every member or fee-payer would know about.

We covered the building entrance all day long for the 10 days of the vote, which gave new rank-and-file leaders a chance to develop and test skills. We spoke with 1,000 members, agitating about state and city funding for the CUNY system and explaining that a big strike vote would build bargaining power for adjuncts and graduate employees.

Ultimately more than 10,000 PSC-CUNY members across the system participated, with 92 percent voting to authorize a strike. We ultimately settled without striking and gained 10 percent raises for everyone in the bargaining unit. Some 1,500 adjuncts also won three-year appointments, ending the semester-to-semester hiring insecurity they had faced. Many adjuncts and graduate employees were understandably frustrated with the across-the-board percentage increase—such raises inevitably exacerbate inequality in a wall-to-wall union, and adjuncts continue to earn just over $3,000 per course taught.

Still, we successfully worked the central union’s strategy, and, in the process, we enhanced the future bargaining power of contingent workers in the bargaining unit, especially graduate employees.

**RECRUITING STEWARDS**

Many of those who led this effort are now in elected office in our chapter, after barely having been active in the union before. One of the leaders who emerged is now a delegate on our chapter’s executive council and leads our steward program. During the vote, we uncovered as many leaders in the various units and departments as we could. Some of these people became stewards. Half of the departments in our chapter are now covered by one or more stewards.

The new energy in our chapter enabled us to get a graduate employee on the local’s bargaining team, the first in years. Our contract expires again this fall, and in preparation, we launched a balloting process for members to set priorities (at the top of the list: $7,000 per course for all adjuncts). Over the course of a single week, we had one-on-one conversations with more than 400 members and connected with 200 online. We gained about 50 new members during this effort.

Public sector unions need to prepare for “right to work” to become the law of the land when the Supreme Court decides Janus next year. While it’s a huge blow to labor, some unions may even become stronger in the process. To survive, we will need maximum rank-and-file engagement, democratic participation, and steward structures that cover every corner of every union.

All of this takes hard work, but the good news is that almost anyone can do it. Find a couple co-workers and get started.

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After Wisconsin 2011, Before Janus 2018: Lessons for the Next Popular Uprising

Ben and Sarah Manski, University of California, Santa Barbara

Although the Wisconsin Uprising was the early riser in the U.S. protest wave of 2011 that manifested widespread bank protests, capitol occupations, and eventually, Occupy Wall Street, what happened in Wisconsin remains understudied and generally misunderstood. Many descriptions focus on the six week occupation of the State Capitol Building and ignore the mass strikes and other direct actions that took place elsewhere throughout the state, the mobilizations that prefigured the Uprising, and the many months of intense struggle that followed the “official” occupation of the Wisconsin Capitol (e.g. daily actions at the Capitol, a tent city, popular assemblies, and mass demonstrations). More importantly, these descriptions tend to mischaracterize the importance of a few major unions in the Uprising and ignore the more critical leadership of other working class and popular organizations, unions, and communities.

Correcting accounts of the Wisconsin Uprising matters not only because of the truly unprecedented scale and militancy of that wave of mobilization, and not only because the Uprising was largely defeated, but also because the consequences of that defeat suggest that even the most grim warnings about the potential impact of Janus v. AFSCME may be too rosy. In Wisconsin, the enactment of Act 10 (involving annual recertification and other attacks on public sector unions) and of Right to Work legislation provide a lasting form of minority rule through the most extreme gerrymandering in the nation. These and other harms meant that the consequences of losing the 2011 struggle would be more significant than the loss of union power on its own. Furthermore, the breadth and depth of the threat faced by millions of Wisconsinites helps to explain why the Wisconsin Uprising was, in actuality, a mass strike and not merely a set of “union protests.”

The implication for labor scholars working in the looming shadow of Janus should be evident: A myopic focus on Janus and its meaning for labor unions -- developed in isolation from a broader analysis with transnational corporations, and establishing a lasting form of minority rule through the most extreme gerrymandering in the nation. These and other harms meant that the consequences of losing the 2011 struggle would be more significant than the loss of union power on its own. Furthermore, the breadth and depth of the threat faced by millions of Wisconsinites helps to explain why the Wisconsin Uprising was, in actuality, a mass strike and not merely a set of “union protests.”

Wisconsin had long been a heartland for progressive policy and movements, electing leftwing Republicans, Progressives, and Socialists to the highest offices and building the NEA, AFSCME, NOW, USSA, USAS and other major national organizations. Yet since 2011, membership in Wisconsin’s labor unions has fallen by more than a third, with AFSCME dropping from 62,000 to 28,000 members in the first year alone. Public school closings, mass layoffs, and a real decline in teacher compensation have led to an exodus of experienced teachers from the profession and from the state. A larger section of Wisconsin’s middle class, as measured by median family income, dropped into poverty than in any other state.

While those changes can be reasonably attributed directly to the anti-union legislation of 2011 and 2012, they comprise only part of the harms felt by working people as a result of the larger structural adjustment program implemented in Wisconsin since then. The attacks on collective bargaining and the right to belong to a union were part of a cohesive program of austerity and expropriation that included the closure of public libraries, colleges, and parks, ending food and medical assistance to hundreds of thousands of Wisconsinites living in poverty, opening the state to metal and sand mining, preempting municipal labor and welfare laws, eliminating small brewers and other producers from competition with transnational corporations, and establishing a lasting form of minority rule through the most extreme gerrymandering in the nation. These and other harms meant that the consequences of losing the 2011 struggle would be more significant than the loss of union power on its own. Furthermore, the breadth and depth of the threat faced by millions of Wisconsinites helps to explain why the Wisconsin Uprising was, in actuality, a mass strike and not merely a set of “union protests.”

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of the struggles of working class and allied organizations, networks, and communities in the broader popular movement — will result in costly and perhaps avoidable mistakes. What then are relevant lessons from Wisconsin? We share two, drawn from Ben’s ongoing social movement research as well as our shared personal experiences and discussions.

First, that in considering the possibilities for a post-Janus world, we need to account not only for the state of labor unions as they are today, but more broadly and deeply for the array of popular organizations, networks, communities, resources and activist cultures that have been constructed in the course of struggle over the past several decades. What made the Wisconsin Uprising possible and shaped the actions of its initiators was a history of movement building and organizing in the course of struggle on various terrains against a structural adjustment program imposed from above. Some of this struggle involved labor unions, as in strikes in Kenosha, Clintonville, Jefferson, Madison, Milwaukee, as well as across the border in the 1990s so-called “Labor Warzone” of central Illinois. Much of it took place with other or additional popular actors on other terrains, as in resistances to the corporatization of welfare, prisons, agriculture, K-12 and higher education, or in the anti-mining and treaty rights movements, or in Wisconsin’s comparatively high level of engagement in international solidarity and anti-corporate campaigns. Out of all these, activists produced all the elements of the popular movement that initiated and led the rising up of Wisconsin’s working class — the practices of Capitol occupations, of sing-a-longs, of strong union-student-community solidarity around budget battles, and much more, as well as the individuals, networks, and organizations that prepared and then actually led the way.

If, in January of 2011 an otherwise uninformed researcher would have interviewed the leadership of Wisconsin’s three biggest public sector unions -- AFSCME, SEIU, and WEAC -- about their expectations for the coming months, that scholar would have had no clue that 100,000s of people would be assembling shortly on the State Capitol grounds. But if that same researcher were to have interviewed activists from smaller unions, student unions, farm organizations, and pro-democracy organizations, the expectation of uprising would have been evident.

This leads to our second lesson. In this period of Janus, federal austerity and hatemongering, and extremist democratic collapse — this period in which what happened earlier in Wisconsin and other labor heritage states appears to have prefigured what is happening nationally — identifying, strengthening, and pushing forward the popular actors most prepared for the challenges of the coming period of struggle is not just advisable, it is necessary to the success of the cause of labor. One of the critical causes of the defeat of Wisconsin was the failure of the actual leadership of the Uprising to act successfully as a force capable of contradicting demobilization and overcoming resistance to escalation on the part of the biggest labor union and Democratic Party bureaucracies.

By actual leadership we mean the student organizations, member-controlled labor unions (MTI, IAFF 311, TAA and others), and other popular organizations and individual activists and elected officials that initiated nearly all the major mobilizations and escalations of the 2011, including the occupations, sectoral strikes, recall process, and even the initial action by Democratic state senators in leaving the state to deny quorum. This actual leadership experienced marginalization in the course of 2011, and as a result, this marginalization proved costly and possibly determinative.

As an illustration, in Ben’s interviews with leading figures in Uprising, he found not only that activists from farm, community, racial justice, and student organizations believed themselves to have been progressively marginalized by officials from the largest unions and the Democratic Party, but also that, perhaps shockingly, the presidents and executive leadership of leading unions consistently referred to unions...
as “them” or “the unions.” These included leaders from the Madison and Milwaukee teachers’ unions, firefighters union, teaching assistants, and various insurgent locals of AFSCME – all of the unions that actually led the way into the Capitol and provided the greatest muscle and militancy in the Wisconsin struggle.

To be sure, those leaders working to escalate the Uprising did engage in substantial solidarity and mutual aid through various coalitions such as the Wisconsin Wave and Wisconsin Resists! Yet our shared analysis finds that this leadership lacked not only the necessary resources to counter demobilization, but more importantly lacked a recognition of the changed and still changing logic of the struggle. The Uprisers did the same things they had done before over the past 20 years, only on a much larger scale. They acted as if a mobilization directly participated in by up to one-in-five Wisconsinites would be bound to succeed; after all, even popular revolutions rarely get those kinds of participation rates. But their movement from below was up against a different kind of foe than in the past; a new movement from above was orchestrated by Wisconsin Manufacturers and Commerce and led by Scott Walker. Against a foe engaged in total war, the loss of initiative and agenda-setting to labor and political officials who sought a return to normalcy proved disastrous. Despite moves to escalate via the general strike movement, the practice of popular assemblies, and convenings of local governments to prepare for a parallel counter-government from below, the trajectory of the overall struggle turned elsewhere.

As some had earlier suggested regarding Wisconsin’s Act 10 and Right to Work legislation, there are those today who argue that Janus will eventually bring about the conditions for a renovated unionism. Maybe so, but in the immediate term, if the national experience comes to resemble to what Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and other labor heritage states have been through of late, we can expect major losses for union power and great harm to working and poor people. Replicating the great successes and avoiding the failures of 2011 require attention to the same central lessons. First, that the real leadership for the coming struggle is to be found in a broad rather than narrow reading of the labor and popular movement that has been built over the past several decades. Second, that having identified the national equivalents of the unions and popular organizations and practices that produced the Wisconsin Uprising, it is vital that those actors develop a nearly messianic sense of self-confidence and mutual solidarity.